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Abstract 
Increasing complexity and first scandals indicate that the current control structures for organic food is 
insufficient. The main challenges are different methods of implementation on the national level and 
the collaborative responsibility between the public and the private sector. Both often cause lacking 
clarity and disagreements. The following contribution focuses on instruments to enhance the quality of 
certification of organic food. Only a few of the suggested instruments have been included as necessary 
requirements yet. Given the risk of deficient quality assurance and at the same time increasing control 
costs, it seems urgent to trigger discussions on risk-oriented auditing and to improve the current 
certification system.  
 
Introduction  
Quality assurance is a crucial issue for the organic market. The information asymmetries related to the 
process-oriented attributes of organic production (credence quality) can not easily be bypassed by 
classical quality signals such as advertising, branding, and guarantees. Over the past years a 
certification system has been established to ensure organic quality. However, it is conjecturable that 
certification systems are susceptible to opportunistic behaviour (McCluskey, 2000). In a market in 
which the company to be supervised can choose its own auditor, misleading incentives may occur. 
From the viewpoint of the certification body, a cheap certification can be a decisive competitive 
advantage in certification markets. Low-cost strategies might significantly affect the quality of 
inspections. Hence, the underlying institutional structure can considerably influence the effectiveness 
and reliability of the whole certification system. Only if the label is recognized as a valid signal, 
customer’s confidence will increase.  
The following analysis deals with the control validity of the organic certification system. Thus, the 
relevant institutional framework is presented. The model based on a Principal Agent Approach 
provides the base for the discussion about the audit quality of organic certification. Additionally, 
results from the research on financial auditing complement the analysis.  
 
Methodology 
 
Basic Structure of Organic Certification 
In most countries the organic certification system has a core structure as illustrated in figure 1. Key 
feature is that inspections are carried out by independent bodies (third party audit) conforming to 
standards laid down by external organisations. The starting point is the flow of goods between 
farmers, processors and consumers. The supplier provides the organic certificate serving as quality 
signal, which is issued by a neutral certifier based on the quality and certification standards laid down 
by the public sector (e.g., EU regulation 2092/91 or OFPA). Governmental certification systems are 
established to serve consumer protection purposes by providing quality labels to improve market 
transparency.   
Figure 1: Basic structure of the organic certification system 
According to the official guidelines, the basic structure of the organic certification system is the same. 
However, two main types of implementation can be differentiated:  
Polypolistic structure: In the majority of the countries, the operative inspection tasks are delegated to 
private certifiers, which can be either domestic certification bodies or foreign ones (Wynen, 2004). An 
oligopolistic structure might occur as well, associated with strong national accreditation programmes 
and/or the public control of the organic certification market. 
Monopolistic structure: Completely public driven systems as in Denmark or Finland are rather 
exceptional. In these countries, both monitoring and certification are carried out by public authorities. 
Thus, the realisation of organic control is part of a governmental bureaucratic process (Seppänen und 
Helenius, 2004). The working principle is similar in nations such as the Netherlands, where the public 
sector authorises one certification body to do the organic inspections (c.f., SKAL).  
 
The Basic Research Model  
The main focus of the following analysis will be on a certification market in which a supplier can 
choose between several certification bodies (polypolistic type). Our model refers to a variety of 
research approaches analysing the field of financial auditing. Since the seminal studies of Antle (1982) 
and DeAngelo (1981) many theoretical approaches to audit quality have been applied, generally based 
on decision theory, game theory, or agency approach.  
The premise of the model is based on rational and risk-neutral agents tending to act opportunistically. 
Assuming the existence of a given inspection technology, the probability of discovering shortcomings 
grows with increased inspection intensity, as do investigation costs. Certification fees are fixed 
exogenously. Under these conditions, the certification body acts to minimize costs  
The certifier’s optimisation calculus can be represented as follows: The certifier’s marginal cost (MCC) 
arise from the marginal cost of the inspection (MCI) together with the marginal opportunity cost of the 
loss of the client (MCO). The latter pertain to the contingency that a company will replace a certifier it 
views as too strict with a more lenient one. Against a unilateral minimization of these costs weigh the 
increasing costs of a deficient inspection being discovered (MCD), which in turn are composed of the 
marginal cost of a potential loss of reputation resulting from inadequate inspections becoming 
generally known (MCR) and the marginal cost of liability (MCL). MCD, as well as MCL, will increase 
with decreasing audit quality (q). The costs of liability for example are composed of the probability of 
being held liable and the amount of the potential sanction. With a higher level of audit quality, the 
probability of being sanctioned decreases leading to an above average decline of the marginal cost of 
liability MCL. Thus, the relevant cost functions to be minimized are as follows: 
MCC = MCI + MCO  (1)  
MCD = MCR + MCL (2) 
From the certifier’s point of view, a cost minimum appears at the intersection of the two curves that 
determines the inspection quality to be estimated by the auditor (cf. Figure 2). From these 
considerations, we can derive four basic starting points for improving inspection quality: (1) extending 
the certifier’s liability (increasing the marginal cost of potential liability), (2) intensifying the effects 
on reputation in the certification market (increasing the marginal cost of loss of reputation), (3) 
decreasing the certifier’s dependence on the firm being inspected (reducing the opportunity cost of 
losing the client) and (4) reducing the inspection costs by improving certification technology (reducing 
the marginal cost of the audit). 
  
Figure 2: Determination of the cost minimum inspection standard 
The Empirical Illustration and Discussion 
Besides the more formal research, empirical studies on the quality of financial auditing are also 
widespread. However, an analysis of these empirical findings makes apparent that they are often 
debatable. The following section aims to outline initial starting points for how the audit quality of 
organic certification could be improved. It is based on the described model as well as on a qualitative 
expert survey conducted in 2004.  
 
Intensifying Liability: Intensifying the inspector’s liability raises the marginal cost of the liability and 
thus induces the certifier to increase the quality of the inspection. The certifier’s probability of liability 
is qualified by the effective claims of negligence and the apportionment of the burden of proof. In 
auditing, there is no absolute liability, thus, in each case the certifier’s guilt must be proven by the 
injured party. For outsiders, this is naturally difficult. For this reason, there is currently an intense 
debate on the preventative effects of absolute liability (Sunder, 2003).  
In addition to costs arising from liability, penalties for non-compliance raise the costs for opportunistic 
certifiers: They might be ordered to pay penalties or even be excluded from system participation. In 
contrast to private certification approaches, the public responsibility in organic certification allows to 
enforce criminal prosecution for fraud. 
 
Increasing Reputation Effects: An intensification of the effects on reputation would have an impact 
similar to that of the threat of liability discussed above. If there are no effects on reputation, supplier 
and certifier have a clear interest in superficial certification. The resulting adverse selection will be 
encountered only if marketing advantages are triggered by an accepted label and/or an inspection 
through a certifier known to be thorough.  
Reputation increases with higher market transparency. At present, consumers as well as professional 
buyers have only very little information about the performance of different organic certifying 
agencies. They cannot judge their work and because of the process attributes, they are unable to 
evaluate their activities after purchasing the product. Only few customers actually prefer products 
from specific certification bodies. Therefore, the disclosure of erroneous certifications by the standard 
owner would be a conceivable and efficient variation. Public authorities should enforce their 
monitoring and failed companies and inspectors should be named.  
In most countries the organic certification market is very heterogeneous: Small agencies compete 
against big international agencies. However, the size of the certification body and the consequent 
strengthening of the effects on reputation is an option much debated in the literature on auditing. 
According to the findings of empirical studies in auditing, internationally renowned CPA groups can 
command higher auditing fees than lesser-known equivalent auditors (Niemi, 2004). This can be seen 
as a reputation bonus which would be lost if a scandal occurred. Therefore, in case of doubt, the 
shareholder should call upon the company to contract with a highly reputable certifier.  
 
Reducing Dependence: Traditionally, driven by the organic association, organic controls and advisory 
services were carried out together. However, today separation is mandatory due to ISO Guide 65 (EN 
45011). Separating consulting from certification could contribute to a further mitigation of the 
distinctly dependent relationship that develops if certifiers are also allowed to function as consultants. 
If the certification market functions as an entry into the lucrative consultancy market, the opportunity 
cost of losing a client increases significantly. Knowledge spill-over effects lead to a higher audit quality with the same input of resources. In addition, increased reputation effects can be a result of 
consultancy business combined with auditing.
1 Whether the total impact of a separation will be 
positive or negative is a matter of debate in financial auditing as well (Frankel et al., 2002, 
Windmöller, 2000). Further dependencies might be discussed regarding the dependencies between a 
certification body and organic farming associations or other huge producer associations.  
Another issue is the danger of losing clients in the following period (so-called “low balling”-effect in 
financial auditing) which can have a decisive effect on the auditing report. Thus, it should not be 
allowed for producers to go “opinion shopping“ and change from one certifier to another without any 
restrictions. Nowadays, the organic certification guidelines still allow changing the certification body 
at any time even during the ongoing certification process.  
Improvement of Inspection Technology: In the preceding sections, we assumed perfect inspection 
technology. In practice, with the same costs certifiers can have varying levels of success due to 
different levels of know-how or different software support. Improved inspection technology lowers 
certification costs and, at the same time, contributes to enhanced certification quality. In addition to 
vocational training and better technical support, appropriate instruments include risk-oriented 
inspection approaches and an improved exchange of data and information among the regulatory 
bodies. First projects are implemented considering these issues (cf., European Action Plan for organic 
food and farming or the EISfOM project). 
In financial auditing the adoption of “risk-oriented auditing” is a popular method to enhance 
inspection technology. “Risk-oriented auditing” is associated with a specific classification of clients 
due to the likelihood of fraud. Higher audit frequencies and deeper audit intensities are necessary in 
settings with high audit risks. Additional spot checks increase the discovery of errors whereas long 
audit intervals are only appropriate for companies characterised by a low risk of fraud.  
It becomes apparent that referring to former audit results can only be a starting point to integrate risk 
factors (GfRS, 2003). In addition to specific risk factors for the firms, a standard owner should 
consider the potential risk of damage (e.g., loss of reputation or health risk) and the amount of public 
attention in the case of a crisis in determining and weighting risk factors as well. The identification of 
risk leads to different audit intervals, additional spot checks, and suitable inspection methods. The key 
objective should be the optimization of the cost-benefit ratio associated with the controls by means of 
an assessment of fraud risks and a particular focus on “dangerous” clients. 
 
Conclusions 
The conducted study highlights a variety of starting points, which must be considered when discussing 
a valid control quality of the organic certification system. It appears, however, quite difficult to 
evaluate the costs related to the above-mentioned procedures on a firm’s level as well as on a 
macroeconomic level. An instrument which could have a cost reducing effect, would be an increasing 
implementation of the risk-oriented auditing. Similar positive impacts would also be associated with 
an increasing harmonisation of the national systems. Bureaucratic tendencies might have an opposite 
effect.  
An issue often discussed is whether the monopolistic approach is more effective than the polypolistic 
one. A definite answer cannot be given. The suitability of a purely state-driven approach might 
primarily depend on the expertise of public agencies, but as well on the reputation of the public sector. 
Difficulties arise if the competencies between the public and the private sector are not clearly defined.  
 
Altogether it becomes apparent that all changes of audit quality can just as easily have undesirable 
side-effects (e.g., restraint on competition, higher costs and prices). Such trade-offs are inevitable and 
recommend cautious progress. The overall quality will not necessarily rise. Nevertheless, preventing 
cheap talk is finally the conditio sine qua non for successful organic labelling. 
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